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Abstract This paper examines the impact of per-
ceived unethical behavior by entrepreneurs, angel
investors and venture capitalists on their conflict
process. For this purpose, we use an embedded case
study design to provide a diversity of perspectives on
the topic at hand. From the eye of the beholder, i.e.
investor, entrepreneur or both, 11 conflict situations
were analyzed for any perceived unethical behavior.
Based on findings from within- and cross-case anal-
ysis, we propose that perceived unethical behavior
among venture partners triggers conflicts between
them through increased fault attribution or blaming.
Further, we propose that perceived unethical behavior
affects venture partners’ choice of conflict manage-
ment strategy and increases the likelihood of conflict
escalation and of conflict having a negative partner-
ship outcome such as failure or another form of
involuntary exit. As such, this paper contributes to the
entrepreneurship literature by addressing calls for
more research on the darker sides of investor–investee
relationships.
Keywords Conflict  Business ethics 
Venture capital  Business angels  Angel investors 
Entrepreneurs
JEL Classifications G24  L26  D74
1 Introduction
The importance of angel and venture capital (VC)
investors as a financing source for entrepreneurial
ventures is well documented (e.g., Mason and Harri-
son 1995; Sohl 2003; Vanacker and Manigart 2010).
Unfortunately, risk capital markets are inherently
inefficient due to reputation effects, knowledge spe-
cialization and high search and negotiation costs
(Cable and Shane 1997; Sohl 1999). Because this
makes replacement of either investor or entrepreneur
both hard and expensive, an ongoing cooperative
relationship between these two parties is desirable
(Cable and Shane 1997; Sapienza et al. 1996).
However, previous research indicates that investor-
entrepreneur conflicts are rather common instead and,
as such, cooperation is far from self-evident (Parhan-
kangas and Landstro¨m 2006). Further corroborating
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conflicts’ importance, investor–entrepreneur conflicts
have been shown to substantially affect their partner-
ship’s life span and success (e.g., Higashide and Birley
2002). Despite this, empirical work on conflicts
between and among angel investors, VCs and entre-
preneurs is still scant. To address this gap in the
literature, this article seeks to extend our theoretical
understanding of conflicts between entrepreneurs and
investors. Given that conflict is a process that unfolds
over time, scholars have previously suggested that
more insight is needed into conflict’s inputs and
outputs ‘‘to clarify how and why its process unfolds as
it does’’ (Forbes et al. 2010, p. 579). As such, we aim
to examine how perceived unethical behavior by
entrepreneurs, angel investors or VCs affects the
emergence of conflict, reaction to conflict as well as
conflict’s effects on their partnership.
The focus on perceived unethical behavior is
motivated by the fact that it has been previously
suggested to engender conflict (e.g., Viswesvaran and
Deshpande 1996; Weeks and Nantel 1992), yet the
relationship between these two concepts has hitherto
not been examined. As such, studying the impact of
perceived unethical behavior on how investors and
entrepreneurs make sense out of and react to their
conflicts should help unravel the complex relation-
ships between unethical behavior and conflict. Addi-
tionally, by examining the role of perceived unethical
behavior in investor–entrepreneur relationships, this
article helps move research connecting ethics and
entrepreneurship beyond its ‘‘embryonic’’ state (Harris
et al. 2009, p. 407). While scholars have acknowl-
edged the importance of ethical behavior in investor-
entrepreneur partnerships (e.g., Boatright 1999; Fassin
1993), they are yet to study its effects explicitly. Taken
together, we thus believe this study to make several
contributions to the entrepreneurship literature.
2 Literature review
Conflict refers to disagreements about the work that
should be done or how it should be done1 as well as to
disagreements that arise due to differences in person-
alities (Jehn 1995; Jehn and Bendersky 2003). A long
tradition of research on conflict in work groups has
revealed that conflicts may substantially affect both
the well-being of the individuals involved and the
performance of their work units (e.g., Jehn and
Bendersky 2003). The relevance of this body of
literature for the relationship between investors and
entrepreneurs is clear given that, like individuals in
work groups, investors and entrepreneurs depend on
each other to achieve company value maximization
(Collewaert 2011). With the goal of building and
maintaining a cooperative working relationship
(Cable and Shane 1997; Sapienza et al. 1996),
exchanges among investors and entrepreneurs are
required that facilitate a deeper understanding of each
other’s goals and viewpoints. In such settings, con-
flicts tend to be unavoidable (Yitshaki 2008). Previous
research has confirmed conflict’s relevance in inves-
tor–entrepreneur settings given that conflicts reduce
an entrepreneur’s value assessment of investor
involvement (Sapienza 1992) and increase both
investors’ and entrepreneurs’ intentions to exit the
venture (Collewaert 2011). Investor–entrepreneur
conflicts have also been shown to affect venture
performance (Higashide and Birley 2002). Only one
study to date has examined investors’ reactions to
disagreements with their entrepreneurs; Parhankangas
and Landstro¨m (2006) found that VCs with stronger
ties and more managerial experience will use more
active and constructive approaches to dealing with
conflicts. With regard to their emergence, investor–
entrepreneur conflicts have been shown to be stimu-
lated by investors’ involvement (Yitshaki 2008) and
have been associated with more technologically
innovative ventures (Sapienza and Amason 1993).
Conflict is, however, a process which unfolds over
time (Pondy 1967; Korsgaard et al. 2008). Despite the
contributions of previous studies on investor–entrepre-
neur conflicts, they provide little insight into ‘‘specific
events that intervene between the structural ‘‘inputs’’
and decision ‘‘outputs’’ to clarify how and why the
process unfolds as it does’’ (Forbes et al. 2010, p. 579).
According to process theory, one of the dominant
conflict theories (De Dreu and Gelfand 2007), conflict
originates with latent conditions such as goal incom-
patibilities, scarce resources, personal differences,
interference in reaching goals, inefficient communica-
tion and interdependency (Bartos and Wehr 2002;
Pondy 1967). These latent conditions, representing the
context in which conflicts occur, evoke events which in
turn trigger a sense-making process and turn latent
1 This mainly refers to disagreements regarding roles (who does
what) and resource delegation.
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conflict into overt conflict. The latter may in turn elicit
several affective and behavioral reactions (conflict
manifestation) and may affect both the individuals and
company involved (conflict outcome). Critical to note
is that latent conflict may hence not necessarily
transform into overt conflict, but instead requires some
kind of event or behavior that will trigger this transfor-
mation. Forbes et al. (2010), for instance, suggested that
financing decisions involving venture devaluation
represent such an event and showed that such decisions
do indeed cause conflict. Clearly though, much remains
to be learned about conflict-triggering events.
With this study, we aim to extend this research
stream by examining the impact of perceived unethical
behavior as a potential conflict-triggering event.
Unethical behavior pertains to conduct ‘‘that is either
illegal or morally unacceptable to the larger commu-
nity’’, while ethical behavior refers to conduct ‘‘that is
both legal and morally acceptable to the larger com-
munity’’ (Jones 1991, p. 367). Although scholars have
previously suggested that unethical behavior may
engender conflict (e.g., Viswesvaran and Deshpande
1996; Weeks and Nantel 1992), no research to date—to
our knowledge—has examined how this process works
nor has it unpacked the nature and implications of
conflicts where unethical behavior was perceived.
A commonly encountered difficulty in determining
which acts are (un)ethical is whose perception defines
what is morally acceptable (Baker et al. 2006;
Fraedrich 1993). In this research, the perception of
the entrepreneur, VC and/or angel investor is used to
define unethical behavior. Ethics scholars acknowl-
edge strong individual differences in notions of
fairness and equity (Huseman et al. 1987). The unique
sensitivity of individuals to fair and unfair situations
further influences their attitudes and reactions (Huse-
man et al. 1987; Kickul et al. 2005). Given these
individual differences, what may be perceived as an
unfair and unethical treatment by an entrepreneur (or
investor) will not necessarily be seen in the same
manner by their venture partner, who in fact may see
their own behavior as common business practice. In
this paper, behavior is labeled as perceived unethical
behavior when at least one of the parties involved
perceives an unethical treatment. While this percep-
tion may not be shared by the other parties’ involved,
and not necessarily reflect the authors’ view, we argue
that this will nonetheless affect their dyadic interac-
tions and hence serve as a conflict-triggering event.
3 Method
For this study, we use an embedded case study design
to provide diverse perspectives, i.e. of investors and
entrepreneurs, on the topic at hand (Eisenhardt and
Graebner 2007). Eleven companies that received
financing from angel investors and/or VCs were
selected using a theoretical sampling procedure
(Eisenhardt 1989). Based on data collected through a
previous research project (as in Ucbasaran et al. 2003)
on the nature of conflicts between investors and
entrepreneurs, cases were selected to represent a wide
range in conflicts between angel investors, VCs and/or
entrepreneurs. Table 1 provides an overview of the
companies selected and illustrates the variety in and
complexity of their conflicts.
Each of the aforementioned latent conflict condi-
tions is represented at least once in the cases. Even
though most cases represent examples of investor–
entrepreneur conflicts, one case also included disputes
among investors (case I). Further, of the 11 cases used,
three were from the United States (California) and
eight were from Continental Europe (Belgium). Var-
iation is also present in terms of the industries these
companies operate in, ranging from basic consumer
goods and retailing to high-tech activities. Of the 11
cases studied, four had failed prior to and two during
the study (cases B and D). All others were active
during the study and remained so afterwards. For those
who had already ceased operations, failure took place
less than six months prior to data collection. Further,
the active ventures had received risk capital financing
at a maximum of five years prior to the first interview.
Together this should limit the risk of recall bias.
Combining these cases also allows for combining
retrospective and real-time data (Eisenhardt and
Graebner 2007). While the former allows for efficient
data collection, the latter enhances our understanding
of how perceived unethical behavior affects the
conflict process.
We used several data sources including (1) semi-
structured interviews conducted face-to-face, by
telephone or through email with investor(s), entrepre-
neur(s) or both, (2) emails and phone calls to follow up
initial interviews and (3) additional information
including investor–entrepreneur email correspon-
dence (provided by the informant), survey data
regarding the investor–entrepreneur relationship for
previous research project respondents (6 out of 11
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cases)2 and/or statutory required publications for the
Belgian companies on capital increases, shareholder
structure and composition of board of directors and
company status.
We asked informants to relate what they most
frequently argue about with their partners. Such open-
ended questions should increase the accuracy of
retrospective reports and served as a means to elicit
examples of perceived unethical behavior. Cases were
analyzed by both authors independently and subse-
quently cross-checked using within- and cross-case
analysis (Eisenhardt 1989). Through the within-case
analysis we aimed to gain a thorough understanding of
the conflicts in terms of its causes and participants as
well as the perceived unethical behaviors (if any).
Considering the sensitive nature of conflicts and
unethical behavior, it was not always possible to
collect data from all parties involved. For cases A and
I, information could only be gathered from the angel
investor(s) involved, whereas for cases C, G, H and K
the CEO was the only informant. For cases B, D, E, F
and J, information was retrieved from both investors
and entrepreneurs. In line with our general definition
of perceived (un)ethical behavior, labeling behavior as
unethical was based on individual parties’ perception
of right and wrong. When at least one of the
informants’ perceived an unfair and unethical treat-
ment, we subsequently coded perceived unethical
practices into six generally accepted categories of
unethical behavior (see below).3 Using the findings
from the within-case analysis, we then went on to
conduct a cross-case analysis to examine similarities
and differences between cases in terms of the effects of
perceived unethical behavior on the conflict process.
Cases were added to the point of saturation, i.e. where
we felt we could meaningfully distinguish between the
process of conflicts where no unethical behavior was
perceived versus the process of conflict where uneth-
ical behavior was perceived.
4 Findings
4.1 Perceived unethical behavior by venture
capitalists, angel investors and entrepreneurs
Borrowing from the business ethics literature on
stakeholder relations, perceived unethical behavior
may appear in many forms: unfair competition, unfair
communication, abuse of power, privileging one’s
own interests, non-respect of agreement and outright
fraud (Crane and Matten 2004).
As shown in Table 2, our cases present various
forms of perceived unfair competition: entrepreneurs
felt unfairly treated by VCs investing in competitors
without informing them (case H) or stealing deals
away from their VC competitors using false claims
regarding industry contacts towards the entrepreneur
(case K). In other cases, entrepreneurs (case B) and
angel investors (case I) perceived unethical behavior
when (other) investors tried sidestepping and elimi-
nating them with all means possible. Unfair commu-
nication is perceived by providing overoptimistic
information (cases I and F) and withholding crucial
information for reasons of hidden agenda (cases A, B
and H). Entrepreneurs further felt unethically treated
in case J where communication on commissions and
finder fees was deliberately held vague and in case K
where the investor launches rumors in the VC
community about the venture’s bad shape. Examples
of perceived abuse of power include investors enforc-
ing unbalanced contracts (cases J and K) or eliminat-
ing minority shareholders through questionable
methods, such as forcing them to sell their shares
at reduced price or, the opposite, blocking their
investment (cases I and K). Investors also cornered
entrepreneurs by refusing to co-invest in replacing
end-of-life materials, owned by the investor but
crucial to the entrepreneur’s business (case F). In case
H the investor—wanting to integrate this venture into
its competitor—does everything within his power to
reach that goal including draining the venture to force
the entrepreneur to go along with this plan. In the end,
the entrepreneur is forced to buy back his shares.
Examples of privileging her/his own interests against
company interests include entrepreneurs or investors
billing excessive costs (cases A and F), entrepreneurs
negotiating a better remuneration for themselves with
new investors without the previous investors’ agree-
ment (case I), VCs recovering their investment
2 Cases B, D, E, F, G and I had participated in the larger conflict
research project by completing questionnaires.
3 For cases A and I this hence reflects perceived unethical
behavior from the perspective of the angel investor(s) and for
cases H and K from the perspective of the entrepreneur. In case
B unethical behavior is perceived on both sides, while in cases F
and J the entrepreneur perceives unethical behavior but the angel
investors and venture capitalist do not.
Conflicts between entrepreneurs and investors 639
123
T
a
b
le
2
P
er
ce
iv
ed
u
n
et
h
ic
al
b
eh
av
io
r
an
d
th
e
co
n
fl
ic
t
p
ro
ce
ss
C
as
es
P
er
ce
iv
ed
u
n
et
h
ic
al
b
eh
av
io
r
S
en
se
m
ak
in
g
—
P
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
R
ea
ct
io
n
O
u
tc
o
m
es
A
U
n
fa
ir
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
,
p
ri
v
il
eg
in
g
o
w
n
in
te
re
st
s,
n
o
n
-r
es
p
ec
t
o
f
ag
re
em
en
t,
fr
au
d
A
n
g
el
in
ve
st
o
r:
‘‘
…
I
sh
o
u
ld
ca
ll
m
y
p
ar
tn
er
a
b
u
si
n
es
s
d
ev
il
…
W
h
y
d
id
it
g
o
w
ro
n
g
?…
Y
o
u
k
n
o
w
,
a
re
al
co
n
m
an
al
w
ay
s
g
o
es
ab
o
u
t
it
cl
ev
er
ly
…
an
g
el
in
v
es
ti
n
g
h
as
le
ft
a
n
as
ty
ta
st
e.
I’
m
tr
y
in
g
to
fo
rg
et
th
at
n
ig
h
tm
ar
e
as
q
u
ic
k
ly
as
p
o
ss
ib
le
.’
’
1
.
In
v
es
to
r
d
em
an
d
s
th
at
ex
p
en
se
s
b
e
ac
co
u
n
te
d
fo
r
an
d
as
se
ts
ar
e
b
ro
u
g
h
t
in
2
.
W
h
en
th
is
d
o
es
n
’t
h
ap
p
en
C
E
O
is
fi
re
d
3
.
In
v
es
to
r
tr
ie
s
to
se
iz
e
p
o
ss
es
si
o
n
o
f
p
ro
m
is
ed
as
se
ts
(b
u
t
fa
il
s
as
th
ey
d
o
n
’t
ex
is
t)
1
.
C
E
O
d
is
ch
ar
g
ed
2
.
V
en
tu
re
fa
il
s
B
U
n
fa
ir
co
m
p
et
it
io
n
,
u
n
fa
ir
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
,
n
o
n
-r
es
p
ec
t
o
f
ag
re
em
en
t
In
v
es
to
r
an
d
h
is
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
v
e
b
la
m
e
th
e
en
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r
fo
r
th
e
co
n
fl
ic
tu
al
si
tu
at
io
n
an
d
th
e
o
th
er
w
ay
ar
o
u
n
d
.
In
ve
st
o
r’
s
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
ve
:
‘‘
m
u
ch
o
f
m
y
ti
m
e
w
as
sp
en
t
fi
g
h
ti
n
g
th
e
en
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r’
s
n
ee
d
to
h
av
e
a
jo
b
th
at
h
e
h
ad
co
m
p
le
te
co
n
tr
o
l
o
v
er
…
C
o
m
p
an
y
B
n
ee
d
s
to
b
e
le
d
b
y
so
m
eo
n
e
w
it
h
cl
ea
r
st
re
n
g
th
s
in
b
u
si
n
es
s
d
ea
li
n
g
s
an
d
w
il
l
fa
il
if
h
e
is
u
n
ab
le
to
st
ep
as
id
e
in
o
rd
er
fo
r
th
at
to
h
ap
p
en
’’
E
n
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r:
‘‘
I
fi
n
d
[t
h
e
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
v
e’
s]
as
se
rt
io
n
s
to
b
e
ab
su
rd
an
d
to
sm
ac
k
o
f
so
m
e
in
n
er
p
er
so
n
al
co
n
fl
ic
t,
ra
th
er
th
an
an
y
th
in
g
el
se
.
T
h
er
e
is
ju
st
a
v
er
y
b
ig
d
is
co
n
n
ec
t
b
et
w
ee
n
h
is
p
o
si
te
d
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
s
an
d
th
e
re
al
it
ie
s
w
e
an
d
co
m
p
an
y
B
h
av
e
fa
ce
d
o
v
er
th
is
p
as
t
y
ea
r.
’’
‘‘
I
am
v
er
y
so
rr
y
fo
r
th
is
o
u
tc
o
m
e,
b
u
t,
I
m
u
st
al
so
w
as
h
m
y
h
an
d
s
o
f
th
at
si
n
fo
r
th
e
af
o
re
m
en
ti
o
n
ed
re
as
o
n
s’
’
1
.
R
ep
re
se
n
ta
ti
v
e
as
k
s
C
E
O
to
st
ep
as
id
e
2
.
R
ep
re
se
n
ta
ti
v
e
is
re
m
o
v
ed
fr
o
m
B
o
ar
d
3
.
A
cc
u
sa
to
ry
em
ai
ls
se
n
t
b
ac
k
an
d
fo
rt
h
4
.
R
ep
re
se
n
ta
ti
v
e
ad
v
is
es
in
v
es
to
r
to
w
it
h
d
ra
w
h
is
fu
n
d
s
5
.
In
v
es
to
r
re
fu
se
s
to
p
ro
v
id
e
ad
d
it
io
n
al
fu
n
d
in
g
an
d
ex
it
s
1
.
R
ef
u
sa
l
o
f
fo
ll
o
w
-o
n
fu
n
d
in
g
2
.
In
v
es
to
r
ex
it
3
.
V
en
tu
re
fa
il
s
C
N
o
u
n
et
h
ic
al
is
su
e
E
n
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r:
L
o
o
k
in
g
b
ac
k
,
I
w
as
n
o
t
th
e
ri
g
h
t
m
an
fo
r
th
is
st
o
ry
.
W
h
il
e
I
st
il
l
b
el
ie
v
e
th
at
th
e
b
u
si
n
es
s
id
ea
w
as
g
o
o
d
,
d
o
in
g
b
u
si
n
es
s
in
C
h
in
a
in
v
o
lv
es
a
lo
t
o
f
p
o
li
ti
cs
,
w
h
ic
h
is
so
m
et
h
in
g
I’
m
n
o
g
o
o
d
at
…
th
e
an
g
el
in
v
es
to
rs
w
er
e
m
ai
n
ly
co
n
v
in
ce
d
b
y
o
u
r
C
h
in
a
ex
p
er
t,
w
h
o
se
fa
m
e
m
ad
e
th
em
d
re
am
o
f
a
q
u
ic
k
re
tu
rn
.
C
h
in
a-
re
la
te
d
n
u
m
b
er
s
ar
e
al
w
ay
s
en
o
rm
o
u
s,
b
u
t
w
e
p
ro
b
ab
ly
m
ad
e
a
w
ro
n
g
es
ti
m
at
io
n
S
il
en
ce
.
T
h
e
m
ai
n
co
n
fl
ic
t
w
as
b
et
w
ee
n
o
n
e
o
f
th
e
an
g
el
in
v
es
to
rs
an
d
th
e
C
h
in
a
ex
p
er
t,
a
cl
as
h
o
f
eg
o
s,
as
‘‘
b
o
th
w
er
e
u
se
d
to
h
av
in
g
a
lo
t
o
f
su
b
o
rd
in
at
es
an
d
h
en
ce
g
et
ti
n
g
w
h
at
th
ey
w
an
t’
’.
T
h
e
en
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r
p
re
fe
rr
ed
n
o
t
to
g
et
in
v
o
lv
ed
E
n
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r
le
ft
v
o
lu
n
ta
ri
ly
.
F
o
ll
o
w
-o
n
fu
n
d
in
g
w
as
re
fu
se
d
,
b
u
t
d
u
e
to
fi
n
an
ci
al
re
as
o
n
s
640 V. Collewaert, Y. Fassin
123
T
a
b
le
2
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
C
as
es
P
er
ce
iv
ed
u
n
et
h
ic
al
b
eh
av
io
r
S
en
se
m
ak
in
g
—
P
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
R
ea
ct
io
n
O
u
tc
o
m
es
D
N
o
u
n
et
h
ic
al
is
su
e
A
n
g
el
in
ve
st
o
r:
‘‘
T
h
is
is
a
ty
p
ic
al
‘‘
fa
il
ed
’’
co
m
p
an
y
ex
am
p
le
.
It
to
o
k
a
lo
n
g
ti
m
e
an
d
le
ar
n
in
g
cu
rv
e
to
le
t
D
r.
C
,
a
te
ch
n
o
lo
g
is
t,
re
al
iz
e
th
at
‘‘
re
v
en
u
e
is
n
u
m
b
er
o
n
e’
’
to
a
n
ew
co
m
p
an
y
’’
1
.
N
ew
C
E
O
is
fi
re
d
to
p
le
as
e
D
r.
C
2
.
In
v
es
to
rs
w
ar
n
C
E
O
to
fo
cu
s
3
.
In
v
es
to
rs
st
o
p
p
u
tt
in
g
in
ef
fo
rt
.
In
ve
st
o
r:
‘‘
I’
v
e
g
iv
en
u
p
o
n
co
m
p
an
y
D
.
W
e
(t
h
e
B
o
ar
d
)
re
p
ea
te
d
ly
w
ar
n
ed
th
e
m
an
ag
em
en
t
to
fo
cu
s.
T
h
e
en
tr
ep
re
n
eu
rs
w
er
e
to
o
d
ee
p
ly
in
v
o
lv
ed
in
th
ei
r
te
ch
n
o
lo
g
ie
s
an
d
fo
rg
et
th
at
te
ch
n
o
lo
g
y
is
o
n
ly
a
sm
al
l
p
ar
t
o
f
th
e
w
h
o
le
co
m
p
an
y
.
W
h
en
th
ey
ar
e
to
o
tr
en
ch
ed
in
te
ch
n
o
lo
g
y
,
th
ey
fo
rg
et
th
e
to
ta
l
p
ic
tu
re
an
d
th
e
p
u
rp
o
se
o
f
th
e
co
m
p
an
y
’’
V
en
tu
re
fa
il
ed
E
N
o
u
n
et
h
ic
al
is
su
e
A
n
g
el
in
ve
st
o
r:
‘‘
T
h
e
m
ai
n
fo
u
n
d
er
o
f
th
e
co
m
p
an
y
w
an
ts
to
k
ee
p
th
e
fu
ll
co
n
tr
o
l
o
f
th
e
co
m
p
an
y
in
h
is
o
w
n
h
an
d
s.
H
e
st
u
b
b
o
rn
ly
h
o
ld
s
o
n
to
k
ee
p
in
g
5
0
%
o
f
th
e
sh
ar
es
.
T
h
er
ef
o
re
th
e
ex
p
an
si
o
n
o
f
th
e
co
m
p
an
y
an
d
th
e
te
ch
n
ic
al
d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t
is
g
o
in
g
sl
o
w
er
th
an
w
h
at
sh
o
u
ld
b
e
p
o
ss
ib
le
’’
E
n
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r:
‘‘
in
v
es
to
rs
se
e
ca
p
it
al
n
ee
d
s,
g
ro
w
th
p
at
h
,
co
m
p
an
y
st
ra
te
g
y
an
d
ex
it
o
n
ly
fr
o
m
an
in
v
es
to
r
p
er
sp
ec
ti
v
e’
’
S
il
en
ce
.
B
o
th
p
ar
ti
es
sa
w
th
is
as
in
h
er
en
t
to
th
ei
r
ty
p
e
o
f
p
ar
tn
er
sh
ip
an
d
co
n
si
d
er
ed
it
b
et
te
r
n
o
t
to
m
ak
e
to
o
b
ig
o
f
a
d
ea
l
o
u
t
o
f
th
is
.
A
ll
p
ar
ti
es
st
il
l
in
v
o
lv
ed
,
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
re
m
ai
n
ed
st
ab
le
F
U
n
fa
ir
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
,
ab
u
se
o
f
p
o
w
er
,
p
ri
v
il
eg
in
g
o
w
n
in
te
re
st
s
E
n
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r:
‘‘
h
e
w
as
o
n
ly
in
te
re
st
ed
in
co
n
so
li
d
at
in
g
,
n
o
t
in
in
v
es
ti
n
g
.
H
e
o
n
ly
ca
re
d
ab
o
u
t
w
h
at
h
e
co
u
ld
g
et
o
u
t
o
f
it
,
…
H
e
d
id
n
’t
w
an
t
to
re
co
g
n
iz
e
th
e
is
su
e…
M
y
co
n
cl
u
si
o
n
?
I
w
il
l
n
ev
er
ac
ce
p
t
a
m
in
o
ri
ty
sh
ar
eh
o
ld
er
p
o
si
ti
o
n
ag
ai
n
’’
S
y
n
er
g
ie
s
as
a
m
ai
n
re
as
o
n
fo
r
in
v
es
ti
n
g
w
as
al
so
co
n
fi
rm
ed
b
y
th
e
in
v
es
to
r
1
.
R
ep
ea
te
d
d
em
an
d
s
fo
r
so
lu
ti
o
n
2
.
N
o
re
ac
ti
o
n
fr
o
m
in
v
es
to
r
ex
ce
p
t
fo
r
se
n
d
in
g
ad
d
it
io
n
al
b
il
ls
(w
h
ic
h
en
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r
re
fu
se
s
to
p
ay
)
3
.
E
n
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r
sw
it
ch
es
to
to
ta
ll
y
d
if
fe
re
n
t
in
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
,
u
se
le
ss
fo
r
th
e
in
v
es
to
r
4
.
S
ta
rt
lo
o
k
in
g
fo
r
ex
it
o
p
ti
o
n
s
an
d
m
er
g
es
A
n
g
el
in
v
es
to
r
ex
it
s
w
h
en
co
m
p
an
y
m
er
g
es
w
it
h
in
d
u
st
ri
al
p
ar
tn
er
E
n
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r:
‘‘
If
th
at
m
er
g
er
w
o
u
ld
n
’t
h
av
e
co
m
e
th
ro
u
g
h
,
th
is
w
o
u
ld
n
o
t
h
av
e
en
d
ed
p
re
tt
y
…
’’
Conflicts between entrepreneurs and investors 641
123
T
a
b
le
2
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
C
as
es
P
er
ce
iv
ed
u
n
et
h
ic
al
b
eh
av
io
r
S
en
se
m
ak
in
g
—
P
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
R
ea
ct
io
n
O
u
tc
o
m
es
G
N
o
u
n
et
h
ic
al
is
su
e
E
n
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r:
‘‘
In
h
is
h
ea
rt
,
h
e
th
in
k
s
th
is
te
ch
n
o
lo
g
y
w
il
l
h
el
p
p
at
ie
n
ts
an
d
w
il
l
m
ak
e
b
ac
k
al
l
o
f
th
e
m
o
n
ey
h
e
lo
st
p
o
st
-L
eh
m
an
.
T
o
b
e
cl
ea
r,
h
e
is
d
ri
v
en
b
y
b
o
th
id
ea
ls
,
b
u
t
h
e
u
n
d
er
st
an
d
s
th
at
to
m
ak
e
m
o
n
ey
in
b
io
te
ch
…
y
o
u
m
u
st
m
ak
e
a
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
at
th
e
b
ed
si
d
e’
’
1
.
E
n
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r
ig
n
o
re
d
in
v
es
to
r
an
d
k
ep
t
p
u
sh
in
g
fo
rw
ar
d
2
.
A
ft
er
p
o
si
ti
v
e
fe
ed
b
ac
k
,
in
v
es
to
r
g
iv
es
g
o
3
.
In
co
n
su
lt
at
io
n
w
it
h
in
v
es
to
r
p
ro
g
ra
m
s
ar
e
p
ri
o
ri
ti
ze
d
E
n
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r:
‘‘
I
re
fu
se
d
to
p
la
y
al
o
n
g
w
it
h
th
is
st
ra
te
g
y
an
d
k
ep
t
p
u
sh
in
g
th
e
p
ro
g
ra
m
s
fo
rw
ar
d
.
T
h
en
w
e
b
eg
an
to
g
et
v
er
y
p
o
si
ti
v
e
d
at
a
o
n
a
p
ro
g
ra
m
th
at
h
e
h
ad
b
ee
n
d
is
m
is
si
v
e
o
f.
H
e
re
al
iz
ed
th
at
w
e
sh
o
u
ld
n
o
t
k
il
l
th
e
p
ro
g
ra
m
an
d
w
as
w
il
li
n
g
to
al
lo
w
u
s
to
sp
en
d
o
n
th
is
p
ro
g
ra
m
—
al
b
ei
t
ca
u
ti
o
u
sl
y
’’
1
.
C
o
n
fl
ic
t
so
lv
ed
an
d
al
l
p
ar
ti
es
st
il
l
in
v
o
lv
ed
2
.
In
v
es
to
r
n
o
w
ta
k
in
g
th
e
le
ad
in
ra
is
in
g
se
ri
es
A
fi
n
an
ci
n
g
an
d
h
as
b
ec
o
m
e
th
ei
r
‘‘
g
re
at
es
t
su
p
p
o
rt
er
’’
H
U
n
fa
ir
co
m
p
et
it
io
n
,
u
n
fa
ir
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
,
ab
u
se
o
f
p
o
w
er
,
p
ri
v
il
eg
in
g
o
w
n
in
te
re
st
s,
fr
au
d
E
n
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r:
‘‘
I’
m
as
su
m
in
g
th
ey
th
o
u
g
h
t
‘a
t
le
as
t
o
n
e
o
f
th
em
w
il
l
su
rv
iv
e’
.
B
u
t
w
h
at
I
ca
n
’t
u
n
d
er
st
an
d
is
h
o
w
th
ey
th
in
k
th
is
(i
.e
.
in
v
es
ti
n
g
in
co
m
p
et
in
g
co
m
p
an
ie
s)
is
re
co
n
ci
la
b
le
fr
o
m
a
co
rp
o
ra
te
g
o
v
er
n
an
ce
p
er
sp
ec
ti
v
e.
H
o
w
ca
n
y
o
u
h
av
e
b
o
th
co
m
p
an
ie
s’
b
es
t
in
te
re
st
s
at
h
ea
rt
?
T
h
e
o
n
ly
th
in
g
th
ey
ar
e
in
te
re
st
ed
in
is
th
ei
r
fi
n
an
ci
al
se
lf
-i
n
te
re
st
,
h
o
w
th
ei
r
ac
ti
o
n
s
af
fe
ct
th
e
en
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r’
s
m
o
ti
v
at
io
n
is
cl
ea
rl
y
ir
re
le
v
an
t’
’
1
.
E
n
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r
g
et
s
le
g
al
ad
v
ic
e
2
.
In
v
es
to
rs
n
o
lo
n
g
er
sh
o
w
u
p
fo
r
B
o
ar
d
m
ee
ti
n
g
s
3
.
E
n
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r
h
as
th
is
le
g
al
ly
v
er
ifi
ed
4
.
In
v
es
to
rs
th
re
at
en
en
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r
w
it
h
li
ti
g
at
io
n
5
.
E
n
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r
b
u
y
s
in
v
es
to
rs
o
u
t
at
h
ig
h
co
st
In
v
es
to
r
ex
it
E
n
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r:
‘‘
It
’s
li
k
e
h
av
in
g
a
T
ro
ja
n
h
o
rs
e
in
y
o
u
r
co
m
p
an
y
’’
I
U
n
fa
ir
co
m
p
et
it
io
n
,
u
n
fa
ir
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
,
ab
u
se
o
f
p
o
w
er
,
p
ri
v
il
eg
in
g
o
w
n
in
te
re
st
s
In
ve
st
o
r:
‘‘
W
e
w
er
e
d
el
ib
er
at
el
y
d
ec
ei
v
ed
b
y
th
e
en
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r
w
h
o
m
ad
e
u
s
b
el
ie
v
e
w
e
w
er
e
in
v
es
ti
n
g
in
a
st
ar
t-
u
p
,
w
h
il
e
re
al
ly
th
e
p
ro
je
ct
w
as
st
il
l
in
se
ed
p
h
as
e.
T
h
ey
h
ad
a
p
ro
to
ty
p
e,
b
u
t
w
h
at
th
ey
fo
rg
o
t
to
m
en
ti
o
n
w
as
th
at
it
d
id
n
’t
w
o
rk
!’
’
1
.
In
it
ia
ll
y
p
as
si
v
e
re
ac
ti
o
n
b
y
in
v
es
to
rs
:
‘‘
w
e
as
su
m
ed
th
e
si
tu
at
io
n
an
d
lo
o
k
ed
fo
rw
ar
d
to
d
ev
el
o
p
in
g
th
e
so
ft
w
ar
e
as
ap
’’
2
.
W
h
en
ad
d
it
io
n
al
co
n
fl
ic
t
ar
is
es
d
u
e
to
en
tr
an
ce
n
ew
p
ar
tn
er
:
-t
w
o
in
v
es
to
rs
q
u
it
at
en
tr
y
v
al
u
e
-t
w
o
o
th
er
s
re
fu
se
to
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
e
in
ro
u
n
d
b
u
t
st
ay
o
n
3
.
P
ar
tn
er
th
re
at
en
s
re
m
ai
n
in
g
in
v
es
to
rs
to
su
e
4
.
A
n
g
el
in
v
es
to
rs
ex
it
A
ll
an
g
el
in
v
es
to
rs
ex
it
J
U
n
fa
ir
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
,
ab
u
se
o
f
p
o
w
er
,
p
ri
v
il
eg
in
g
o
w
n
in
te
re
st
s
E
n
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r:
‘‘
T
h
ey
g
o
ag
ai
n
st
ev
er
y
th
in
g
th
at
co
rp
o
ra
te
g
o
v
er
n
an
ce
is
su
p
p
o
se
d
to
b
e.
O
b
v
io
u
sl
y
m
y
co
m
p
an
y
w
o
u
ld
n
o
t
h
av
e
b
ee
n
w
h
er
e
it
is
to
d
ay
w
it
h
o
u
t
th
em
,
b
u
t
ce
rt
ai
n
p
ra
ct
ic
es
ar
e
re
al
ly
u
n
ac
ce
p
ta
b
le
.
It
’s
ab
o
u
t
ti
m
e
th
e
w
o
rl
d
g
o
t
to
h
ea
r
ab
o
u
t
th
em
’’
1
.
E
n
tr
ep
re
n
eu
r
g
o
t
le
g
al
ad
v
ic
e,
b
u
t
h
e’
s
ti
ed
h
an
d
an
d
fo
o
t
2
.
L
o
o
k
in
g
fo
r
an
in
v
es
to
r
ex
it
o
p
ti
o
n
as
h
e
se
es
n
o
o
th
er
w
ay
o
f
d
ea
li
n
g
w
it
h
th
em
P
re
p
ar
in
g
fo
r
in
v
es
to
r
ex
it
642 V. Collewaert, Y. Fassin
123
through excessive fees (case J) and exercising capital
increases, resulting in intentionally high dilutions of
the entrepreneurs’ shares which struck them as unfair
(cases H, J and K). Further, the cases present
illustrations of non-respect of agreements: investors
refuse to provide follow-on financing without good
reason (case B), entrepreneurs do not fulfil promises of
bringing in assets (case A) or ensuring additional
funding (case B). In case K, the entrepreneur feels
unfairly treated by his VC who had promised to bring
in an international partner, but subsequently refuses to
do so. Outright fraud occurs in cases A and H where
information is deliberately falsified or concealed to
mislead the investor (case A) or entrepreneur (case H).
Finally, no unethical practices were perceived in the
conflicts of cases C, D, E and G.4
4.2 The impact of perceived unethical behavior
on the conflict process
In this section, drawing on conflict process theory
(Pondy 1967), we address how perceived unethical
behavior may affect the conflict process between
investors and entrepreneurs. As presented in Fig. 1,
we propose that perceived unethical behavior
enhances the chance of latent conflicts turning into
overt ones through increased fault attribution (i.e.
blaming).
The case evidence further suggests that perceived
unethical behavior may affect the way in which these
new venture partners react to their conflicts as well as
the effects these conflicts may have on the partnership
itself. The proposed impact of perceived unethical
behavior on conflict’s outcomes is illustrated by
Fig. 2. Case illustrations with selected quotes are
provided in Table 2. We discuss our proposed model
in more detail below.
4.2.1 Conflict sense making: naming and blaming
Cases vary in the way investors and entrepreneurs talk
about their conflicts, depending on whether or not any
unethical behavior was perceived. In cases of no
perceived unethical behavior, there was a greater
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4 We did not intentionally oversample conflict situations with
perceived unethical behavior. Given the limited number of case
studies we cannot draw any conclusions concerning the ratio of
unethical to ethical conflict cases and its generalizeability.
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understanding of both partners having different moti-
vations and goals. Further, there was a sense of shared
responsibility for things having gone wrong. For
instance, in case G the entrepreneur is upset with his
investor for being too focused on the financial side of
the equation, while the investor thinks the entrepre-
neur is too focused on the technology. These incom-
patible goals caused disagreements on injecting
additional funds. While the entrepreneur was defi-
nitely frustrated by his angel investor, he also under-
stood him wanting to take care of his capital and does
not blame him for this. In fact, he states ‘‘He is high
maintenance, but fair’’. Similarly, in trying to explain
what went wrong, the entrepreneur in case C notes that
he ‘‘wasn’t the right man for the story’’ and that he,
together with the investors, ‘‘probably made a wrong
estimation’’. He indirectly exonerates his investors for
refusing to provide follow-on financing and takes up
part of the responsibility for the venture going haywire
by admitting he inaccurately assessed the required
competencies and market potential.
When unethical practices were perceived, the
storytelling turns darker. In case A where the entre-
preneur provided untruthful information to the inves-
tor and embezzled money, the angel investor’s answer
to the question of why it all went wrong was ‘‘you
know, a real conman always goes about it cleverly’’
and concludes by stating that he wants ‘‘to forget that
nightmare as quickly as possible’’. He blames the
entrepreneur and holds him responsible for his failed
investment experience. Similar feelings of anger,
frustration and disapproval are found in other cases
where informants felt unfairly treated. The CEO of
case H for instance indicates that he cannot ‘‘under-
stand how they [the VC] think this [investing in
competing companies] is reconcilable from a corpo-
rate governance perspective’’ and accuses them of
‘‘only being interested in their financial self-interest’’.
Perceived unethical behavior seems to cause part-
ners to look at their interaction and conflicts more
negatively and to see them as a bigger hurdle to their
partnership compared to when no unethical practices
were perceived. Whereas understanding, exoneration
and shared responsibility prevailed in the latter cases,
holding the other party accountable prevailed in the
former ones. This reflects what conflict literature has
referred to as sense making (Korsgaard et al. 2008),
which pertains to labeling events as offensive and
blaming another party for deviating from norms
(Felstiner et al. 1980). Also referred to as naming
and blaming, it comprises the process whereby
individuals perceive an injurious event, label it as
such and subsequently attribute the fault to someone or
something else (Felstiner et al. 1980). While all cases
illustrate some degree of naming and blaming (given
that all conflicts had already transgressed to the overt
stage), conflict sense making does seem to turn more
negative when unethical behavior was perceived.
Based on the impression of being treated unfairly,
attributions are made; this may increase the probabil-
ity of events being classified as grievances (i.e. naming
transforming into blaming) rather than as mere
unfortunate events (i.e. just naming). In a process
model of conflict, perceived unethical behavior may
thus increase the incidence of events moving from the
naming to the blaming phase, which in turn may
enhance the chance of investors and entrepreneurs
experiencing (more) overt conflicts. This proposition
would be corroborated by previous research which has
indicated that when others’ intentions are seen as high
in blameworthiness, which is likely for perceived
unethical behavior, the affected individual is more
likely to assign blame for the event to the other party
(Shaver 1985; Gilbert 1995). Additionally, conflict
literature has identified the need for maintaining a
positive identity as one of the main causes of conflict
Latent conflict conditions 
                               P1 Perceived 
unethical behavior 
Sense making 
(naming/blaming) Conflict 
Fig. 1 Proposed model: the impact of perceived unethical
behavior on conflict emergence
P4
Conflict
escalation
Conflict
manifestation 
Conflict 
outcome 
Perceived unethical behavior 
P3
Conflict
P2 
Fig. 2 Proposed model: the impact of perceived unethical
behavior on conflict outcomes
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(De Dreu and Gelfand 2007). It is likely that when
individuals perceive an unethical treatment, their self-
esteem and positive view of the self are harmed, which
in turn is also likely to cause conflict. Taken together,
this leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Perceived unethical behavior by
investors or entrepreneurs may trigger conflicts
through increased fault attribution to the perceived
unethical party (i.e. blaming).
4.2.2 Conflict manifestation and perceived unethical
behavior
Perceived unethical behavior may further impact
affective and behavioral reactions that are manifested
in the subsequent entrepreneur-investor relationship.
Conflicts elicit a variety of affective (e.g. anger,
distress) and behavioral reactions (e.g. aggression),
which can all be seen as a form of conflict manifes-
tation. In terms of affective reactions to conflict,
entrepreneurs reacted with suspicion and distrust in
cases of perceived unethical behavior. Feelings of
suspicion and distrust peek through entrepreneurs’
pejorative appellations of their investors, such as
‘‘Trojan horses’’ (case H) or ‘‘having had a Machia-
vellian plan from the very beginning’’ (case K). No
such examples were found in cases where no unethical
behavior was perceived.
With regard to behavioral reactions to conflict,
multiple options exist. One can collaborate with the
other party to solve the problem, use more competitive
tactics to achieve one’s goals or avoid the problem
altogether (De Dreu and Gelfand 2007). In our cases,
behavioral responses to conflict were markedly dif-
ferent depending on whether or not unethical behavior
was perceived. In those cases where no unethical
behavior was perceived, conflicting parties either
remained silent or tried resolving the problem
together. For instance, the angel investor in case D
stated ‘‘I’ve given up on [company D].’’ After having
tried several ways to find a compromise with the
founder, including firing the new CEO as he could not
get along with the founder and trying to make the
entrepreneur focus his efforts, the angel investor
finally saw no other way to deal with this problematic
situation than to give up. In case E, the investors
undertook no actions to change the founder’s mind.
Considering the investor was actively involved in his
main job, which had nothing to do with investing, he
preferred to stay away from the conflict between the
more professional angel investors and the entrepre-
neur. This rather passive approach can still be
considered a constructive way of dealing with conflict
as underlying it is a feeling or hope that everything
will work out (Parhankangas and Landstro¨m 2006).
This is not to say that when all parties behave ethically,
contentious tactics are impossible. When the investor
in case G ‘‘stopped funding the company and tried
shutting down research programs’’, the entrepreneur
indicated that he ‘‘refused to play along with this
strategy and kept pushing programs forward’’. Even
though the entrepreneur stubbornly pursued his path,
he did so in a silent way. Further, he and his investor
were able to work their conflicts out as soon as the
entrepreneur could back his promises up with facts.
Conversely, in cases where unethical behavior was
perceived, conflicts were dealt with quite differently. In
case I, angel investors did not agree with the corporate
investor’s strategy and refused to participate in a
follow-on round financing, soon after which they were
forced to exit the venture. The entrepreneurs in cases H
and K immediately sought legal assistance. In case A,
the investor fired the entrepreneur upon learning the
latter had embezzled money. In all cases where
unethical issues had arisen, the reaction to conflict
was immediate and aggressive in that at least one of the
parties involved reacted with aggressive voice or exit,
i.e. a destructive, competing conflict-handling strategy
(Parhankangas and Landstro¨m 2006).
The case evidence suggests that perceived unethical
behavior may affect which strategy will be adopted by
investors and entrepreneurs to manage their conflicts.
This would be consistent with previous research which
has indicated that the final choice of which conflict
management strategy to be employed by new venture
partners will depend on a combination of ‘‘actor-,
relationship- and context-specific factors’’ (Parhan-
kangas and Landstro¨m 2006, p. 778). Applied to
perceived unethical behavior, we thus propose:
Proposition 2a In a conflict situation between
investors and entrepreneurs, perceived unethical
behavior will increase the likelihood of using a
destructive conflict management strategy, such as exit
or aggressive voice.
Proposition 2b In a conflict situation between
investors and entrepreneurs, perceived unethical
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behavior will decrease the likelihood of using a
constructive conflict management strategy, such as
silence or considerate voice.
4.2.3 Conflict escalation and unethical behavior
Perceived unethical behavior also seemed to elicit
conflict escalation, defined as ‘‘an increase in the
intensity of the conflict as a whole’’ (Rubin et al. 1994,
p. 69). It is generally characterized by an increased use
of contentious tactics and a proliferation of issues
(Wall and Callister 1995). An illustration is provided
by venture K’s entrepreneur:
When the venture capitalist also withheld the
investment plan that had been previously
approved, we got legal advice. We realized that
a plan had been prepared from day one and that
the venture capitalist’s intention was to perpe-
trate a wipe-out. When the venture capitalist
demanded additional cost-cutting as conditions
for reinvestment in a (limited) second round, we
decided to attend board meetings through a
conference call from our lawyer’s office. During
one of those last meetings, I said that strictly
speaking I had to file for bankruptcy. Suddenly
the venture capitalist wanted to abort the board
meeting and told me they wanted to talk with me
face-to-face. There they told me that if I couldn’t
arrange an agreement with all the venture
capitalists involved, they would hold me per-
sonally liable and sue me.
Similar threats of prosecution were uttered in case I.
Another example of conflict escalation is found in
case B. While the initial conflict focused on the
investor’s representative (lawyer) sidestepping the
entrepreneur by contacting an industrial partner and
making him another proposal behind the entrepre-
neur’s back, this quickly escalated into the lawyer
asking the entrepreneur to step aside, the entrepreneur
removing the lawyer from the board in response and
accusatory e-mails being sent back and forth. Quoting
from e-mail correspondence, examples of accusations
made were: ‘‘while like you he is also a scientist, he is
also skilled in business dealings and you are not’’,
‘‘Please don’t confuse this perceived issue control or
micromanagement, with wanting to get the job done,
and get it done correctly; without having to ask or
explain many, many times, or stroke ad nauseam
ridiculously frail egos’’ or ‘‘Lastly, with respect to [the
representative’s] insights on fighting for control, well,
again, I am confused—this seems more a statement
about [the representative] fighting with his own
demons, than me’’. These accusations only served to
intensify the already heated conversation, resulting in
the investor withdrawing his funds from the venture.
Not only did perceived unethical behavior stimulate
conflict escalation (as indicated by the first arrow in
Fig. 2 going from unethical behavior toward conflict
escalation), but this escalation also often included
additional, subsequent perceived unethical behavior
(as represented by the arrow in the opposite direction).
For instance, in case K initial perceived unethical
behavior included the VC stealing a deal away from
his competitors using unfair claims toward the entre-
preneur and enforcing an unbalanced contract. This
helped to trigger a first conflict concerning the CEO’s
replacement and acceleration of expenses. The conflict
escalation process as described above, however, also
included the VC starting to spread rumors about the
venture’s bad shape to avoid new investors entering
the venture and forcing both the minority shareholders
and entrepreneurs to exit and sell their shares at
reduced price. Thus, conflict escalation entailed new
perceived unethical behavior from the VC. Conflict
escalation was not observed in any of the cases where
no unfair treatment was perceived.
These findings can be explained by conflict liter-
ature, which has shown that as conflicts persist in time
and more aggressive tactics are used, conflicts have a
tendency to escalate and become exceedingly difficult
to undo (Rubin et al. 1994; Van de Vliert 1997).
Conflicts not only intensify due to more aggressive
behavior (which will likely be reciprocated by the
other party), but also due to more negative perceptions
of and attitudes towards the other party, weakened
social ties and communication problems between
conflicting parties (Friedman and Currall 2003; Rubin
et al. 1994). Because perceived unethical behavior
seems to provoke competitive behavior and will likely
change the perception of the other party to being seen
as unfair or less moral than oneself, conflict escalation
is to be expected. That this may also lead to additional
unethical behavior is consistent with previous
research on counterproductive behaviors in work
relationships. Behavioral integrity literature, for
instance, suggests that an individual’s initial misbe-
havior may desensitize that individual to further
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misbehaviors on his part (Simons 2002), thereby
making it more likely to occur again. Similarly,
perceived unfairness in how one is treated by others
and negative affect may result in spirals of unethical
behavior (e.g., Gino et al. 2009). Initial unethical
behavior inducing further unethical behaviour through
conflict escalation is consistent with this line of
research. This discussion suggests the following
propositions:
Proposition 3a Perceived unethical behavior by
investors or entrepreneurs will increase the likelihood
of their conflicts escalating due to an increased and
reciprocated use of competitive tactics towards each
other and a more unfavorable perception of the
unethical party.
Proposition 3b This conflict escalation is likely to
entail additional perceived unethical behavior.
4.2.4 Conflict outcome and perceived unethical
behaviour
As investors and entrepreneurs become more suspi-
cious of each other, information barriers increase,
knowledge exchange and coordination are impeded
and statements and actions are more easily misun-
derstood (Jehn 1995; Simons and Peterson 2000).
Such negative attitudes and perceptions quickly tend
to be reciprocated by other parties (Gino et al. 2009;
Rubin et al. 1994), leading to a breakdown of the
partnership. All trust vanishes and cooperation stops,
which in turn reduces the chances of conflicts
getting resolved. These theoretical arguments are
corroborated by our case studies given that none of
the parties involved in cases where unethical
behavior was perceived were able to work through
their conflicts.
In all cases where some form of unethical
behavior was perceived, it resulted in the end of
the partnership through premature exit of one or all
of the parties involved. In cases A and K the
entrepreneur exits, in cases B, H, I and F the
investors exited from their portfolio companies (in
case J they are in exit preparation). For cases A, K
and B this exit was almost immediately followed by
venture failure. Even though failure and exit also
occur when parties behave ethically, the chances of
them working through and resolving their conflicts
(cases E and G) are substantially higher because
there is no breach of trust.5 Given that (1)
competitive behavior, blocked cooperation and
distrust have all been suggested as factors contrib-
uting to conflict taking a turn for the bad (Rubin
et al. 1994; Simons and Peterson 2000) and (2) our
case study evidence suggests that perceived uneth-
ical behavior stimulates all three, we propose that
perceived unethical behavior will strengthen con-
flict’s negative effect on the partnership involved.
Thus, we propose:
Proposition 4a Perceived unethical behavior by
investors or entrepreneurs will reduce the chance of
conflict resolution.
Proposition 4b Perceived unethical behavior by
investors or entrepreneurs will increase the likelihood
of conflict leading to a negative partnership outcome,
either by failure or another form of involuntary exit,
through increased competitive behavior towards each
other and increased distrust and blocked cooperation
between them.
5 Conclusion
This paper sought to develop propositions regarding
the impact of perceived unethical behavior on the
conflict process between angel investors, venture
capitalists and entrepreneurs. Using case studies, we
proposed a model to help highlight the role of
perceived unethical behavior in conflict emergence,
conflict management, conflict escalation and conflict’s
effects on investor–entrepreneur partnerships.
Future research can build on this study in several
ways. First, unethical issues and their effects may
vary depending on the stage of the financing
partnership cycle or on the financing source used.
Even though variation was clearly present in terms
of unethical behavior presented by angel investors
and venture capitalists, our limited sample size does
not allow us to generate finer-grained insights
regarding differences between the two. Second, even
5 Although exit also occurred in case C, the entrepreneur states
that his exit was not related to the conflictual relations in his
venture, but rather to the entrepreneur realizing that he wasn’t
the right person for the job and their death valley was going to be
substantially longer than initially foreseen.
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though our cases indicate that perceived unethical
behavior is omnipresent, more research is needed to
understand whether its presence varies depending on
the degree of professionalization of the respective
risk capital markets. In more mature markets,
investors may conform more to governance and
ethical guidelines to protect their reputation, while
entrepreneurs may be better informed regarding the
rules of the game. As such, opposed perceptions of
(un)ethical behavior due to overoptimistic business
plans and broken promises of added value may be
tempered. Finally, future research should examine
the validity of our model adopting a quantitative
research approach. The aim of this article was to
deepen the field of the darker sides of the relation-
ships between angel investors, venture capitalists
and entrepreneurs. As such, our objective was to
raise questions and to encourage critical thinking
concerning the role of ethical issues in conflicts
between these parties.
This study also has practical implications: the
world of entrepreneurship and venture capital is a
hard one where conflicts are inevitable. Parties
engaged in conflicts may have different views on
what is ethically acceptable. In venture investments,
ambiguous situations with different perceptions often
rest upon differences between legal and ethical
views. The venture capital industry has largely been
influenced by its Anglo-Saxon origins with a strong
emphasis on contracts and compliance. In addition to
respecting legal aspects, an ethical attitude however
is necessary to build trust and improve collaboration
between partners. Both investors and entrepreneurs
should reflect on the ethical impact of their attitude
and confront their behavior with their code of
conduct.6 As in all fields, the hard thing—but also
the essence—about codes is to implement them.
Recognizing the ethical issues involved will help
foster ethical behavior among various partners in the
investment process and will increase the chances of
successful collaboration.
To conclude, our study provides several important
contributions. It contributes to the entrepreneurship
literature by (1) addressing a call for more research on
investor–investee relationships in general (Lockett
et al. 2006) and their darker sides in specific (Parhan-
kangas and Landstro¨m 2006) and (2) addressing a call
for more cross-disciplinary research connecting the
fields of business ethics and entrepreneurship (Harris
et al. 2009). This study also informs conflict literature
by more clearly disentangling the links between
conflict and unethical behavior.
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